Carna L. Peterson v. David H. Carter and Janet S. Carter et al : Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
Carna L. Peterson v. David H. Carter and Janet S.
Carter et al : Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dave McNullin; Attorney for Defendants-Respondents;
Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants;
Steven Scheendinen; Attorney for Intervenor;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Peterson v. Carter, No. 15310 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/727
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARNA L. PETERSON, by LARRY 
BROADHEAD, guardiun, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID H. CARTER and JANET 
S. CARTER, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICE, 
Intervenor. 
Case No. 15,310 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM JUDG~lENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE J. ROBERT BULLOCK 
DAVE McMULLIN 
City Office Building 
P. 0. Box 176 
Payson, Utah 84651 
Attorney for Defendants-
Responaents 
STEVEN SCHWENDIMAN 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Intervenor 
JOHN L. VALENTINE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
FILED 
SEP 21 1977 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPRE[lE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAil 
CAR0A L. PETERSON, by LARRY 
BROADllCI\D, guardian, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID H. CARTER and JANET 
S. CARTER, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICE, 
Intervenor. 
Case No. 15,310 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE J. ROBERT BULLOCK 
DAVE tlc~!ULLIN 
City Office Building 
P. 0. Box 176 
Payson, Utah 84651 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
STEVEN SCH~lEtlDHIAN 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Intervenor 
JOHN L. VALENTINE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\IER COURT 
RCLIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARCU~lENT ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THIS COURT, SITTING IN EQUITY, SHOULD 
REVIEW THE COMPLETE RECORD AND REVERSE 
THE TRIAL COURT IF ITS DECISION IS 
AGAINST THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE ...................... 
POINT II 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY 
AGAINST THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
CARNA PETERSON UNDERSTOOD THE TRANSACTION 
WITH THE RESPONDENTS . . . . . • • . 
POINT III 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY 
AGAINST THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
tlO UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS EXERTED OVER 
CARNA PETERSON 
CONCLUSION 
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 
Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah l I 257 P. 673 ( 19 27) 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 
Buchmayer v. Buchmayer, 68 Cal.2d 462, 157 P.2d 
( 1945). 
. . 
710 (1965) 
9 (1945) 
Burgess v. Colby, 93 Utah 103, 7l P.2d 185 (1937) 
i 
PAGE 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
11 
14 
4,5 
4 
13 
11 
4,6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Davis v. Hulburt, 242 P.2d 784, 194 Oc. 584 (1952) 
Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 P. 433 (1915) 
Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034 (1929) 
Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959) 
l1itchell v. l·litche11, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974) 
Morgan v. Thompson, 46 N.M. 282, 127 P.2d 1037 (1942) 
O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 55, 37 P.2d 770 (1934) 
Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051 (1932) 
Seequist v. Seequist, 524 P.2d 548 (1974) 
Teegarden v. Lewis, 145 Ind. 98, 40 N.E. 1047, 44 N.E. 9 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 390, 412 
P.2d 920 (1966) 
Wilson v. Cunningham, 24 Utah 167, 67 P. 118 (1901) 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
41 Am.Jur.2d Incompetent Persons §92 Et seq. 
STATUTES AND RULES CITED 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, §9 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 72(a) 
ii 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN TI!E SUPREtlE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARNA L. PETERSON, by LARRY 
BROADHEAD, guardian, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DAVID H. CARTER and JANET 
S. CARTER, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICE, 
Intervenor. 
Case No. 15,310 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit in equity to vacate a deed brought by 
the guardian of Carna Peterson, an incompetent person, on 
the basis of said person's incompetency and on the basis of 
undue influence exercised over her by the defendants-respon-
dents (hereinafter referred to as respondents). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court held a trial on the merits and found 
that Carna Peterson knew and understood the nature of the 
transaction, the lien position of the State of Utah, and the 
consequential limitation on the benefits to be derived by 
her for the sale of the property, and that respondents did 
not exercise any undue influence, fraud or duress over Carna 
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Peterson when acquiring the subject property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have this Court make a complete 
review of the facts as revealed by the record and to reverse 
the trial court's findings, and to have the case remanded to 
the lower court for trial on the issues of the right of the 
respondents to receive reimbursement for improvements done 
on the property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By warranty deed dated September 2, 1975, (Ex. 3), 
Carna Peterson conveyed her home and underlying real pro-
perty of approximately 1 acre located in Juab County, State 
of Utah, to the respondents for the sum of $3,200.00. Prior 
to this time, by an instrument entitled "Bill of Sale" dated 
the 29th day of August, 197 2, (Ex. 2) , the respondents tried 
to purchase the same home and property for the same price, 
but were frustrated in their attempts to do so. 
At the time of the execution of the warranty deed, 
Carna Peterson was 91 years of age and was residing in a 
rest home since she was unable to care for herself. Prior 
to this ti~e, the State of Utah had recorded a welfare lien 
against the property in excess of $28,000.00, (Ex. 8), whi~ 
was released by an instrument dated the 8th of Septemberr 
1975. (Ex. 6). 
Sometime around September 8, 1975, the attorney for the 
respondents, Milton Harmon, received a phone call from LeR~ 
Jackson, the attorney for Mrs. Peterson's family, objecting 
-2-
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to the tcansaction, and questioning Ncs. Petecson's com-
petency. (R. 91-92). 
On the 13th day of November, 1975, Larcy Broadhead was 
duly appointed the guardian of the person and estate of 
Carna L. Petecson, and on November 22, 1975, by his attorney 
Jackson Howard, he notified the respondents of the family's 
intent to vacate the deed, demanding reconveyance of the 
propecty. (Ex. 7). 
This suit was then instituted against the respondents 
around the 19th of December, 1975, with the appellants 
alleging that Carna Peterson was incompetent at the time of 
the transaction, that she had received less than the full 
consideration foe the pcoperty and that the respondents had 
exercised undue influence over Carna Peterson. On the 29th 
of July, 1976, the State of Utah intecvened to protect its 
interest in the property. 
The trial court after a trial on the merits, ruled that 
Carna Peterson understood the transaction and was not under 
any undue influence or duress, but made no finding as to the 
reasonablness of the consideration received by her or the 
State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
Appellants' contention on appeal is that the trial 
court's findings are against the great weight of the evi-
dence produced at trial. This appeal seeks a review of the 
trial record and a reversal of the tcial court's findings. 
-3-
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POHJT I 
THIS COURT, SITTING Hl EQUITY, SfiOULD lcEVIE1! ~IJE COt!-
PLETE RECORD AND REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT IP ITS DECISION IS 
AGAINST THE PREPONDERANCE OP THE EVIDENCE. 
A suit to vacate the deed of an incompetent is a 
classic exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction. 41 
Am.Jur.2d Incompetent Persons §92 Et Seq. See also Anderson 
v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 (1945). As such, this 
Court has both the duty and the prerogative to review the 
law and the facts of the trial court and make its own find inc, 
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. 
Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah; Rule 72(a) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 
P.2d 1359 (Utah, 1974); and Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 257 
P. 673 (1927). In effect, this court has a trial de novo on 
the record. Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034 (1929). 
On such a review, if, after making due allowance for the 
better opportunity of the trial court to observe the demeanm 
of the witnesses, determining their credibility and weight 
of their testimony, the Supreme Court is persuaded that the 
findings of the trial court is against a fair preponderance 
or greater weight of the evidence, then it should direct the 
findings and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Jensen, supra, and Burgess v. Colby, 93 Utah 103, 71 P.2d 
185 (1937). The test applied on such an equity review is 
whether the trial court's findings are against the greater 
weight of the evidence, or if the evidence clearly outweighs, 
-4-
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or is inconsistent with, the trial court's finding. Wilson 
~___s:_~~nincjham, 24 Utah 167, 67 P. 118 (1901 •; and Paxton v. 
Paxt_<:J_rl_, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051 (1932). 
POHlT J I 
THE liCIGflT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLl' liGAINST THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FHlDitiG THAT CARNA PETERSON UtTDCRSTOOD THE TRAilS-
ACTION WITH THE RESPONDENTS. 
a. Applicable Test: 
The test for determining whether a person had sufficient 
mental capacity to contract was stated in O'Reilly v. McLean, 
84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770, (1934), wherein the court quoting 
from Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 P. 433 (1915) adopted 
the test stated in Teegarden v. Lewis, l45 tnd. 98, 40 N.E. 
1047, 44 N.E. 9, as follows: 
In ordinary contracts the test is; 
Were the mental facilities so deficient 
or impaired that there was not sufficient 
power to comprehend the subject of the con-
tract, its nature and its probable con-
sequences, and to act with discretion in 
relation thereto, or with relation to the 
ordinary affairs of life? 
This has also been adopted as the test in determining whether 
or not the grantor of a deed has sufficient mental capacity 
to make the deed. Anderson v. Thomas, supra. In addition, 
strict scrutiny of any transaction between an extremely aged 
or severely ill person and others should be imposed by the 
court reviewing the same. Anderson, at 148. (Concurring 
opinion of Justice Turner). See also Seequist v. Seequist, 
524 P.2d 598 (1974). 
-5-
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Of sane interest to the case presently before this 
Court is Burgess v. Colby, supra. There th0 court quoted 
extensively from th2 record giving some guidance of the 
factual analysis that needs to occur on appellate review. 
For example, the Supreme Court determined in reviewing the 
trial court's and jury's finding, that independent witnesses 
should be given more weight than those who have an interest 
in the outcome. Burgess, at 196. The Court further stated 
that the ability to ". 
. talk about the affairs of the day, 
of his travels, of the farm and its care, and to recognize 
his friends when they called" were also important considera-
tions, showing the mental state of a purported incompetent. 
Burgess, at 196. 
b. Evidence Showing Incompetence. 
The record is replete with testimony of the incompeten~ 
of Carna Peterson and her inability to understand even the 
ordinary affairs of life. For example, she could not compr-
ehend when her property taxes were due, (R. 30), or what 
bills were paid or when they were due. (R. 32). She thought 
that she had been in the rest home for four years when in 
fact she had only been there one year and a half. (R. 54). 
She claimed that the rest home was trying to starve her and 
that the family had not been to see her for four years' which 
were both untrue. (R. 35). She would become confused about 
the maintenance of her property including watering the 
lawns. (R. 35). In fact, two witnesses even testified that 
Carna Peterson suffered from hallucinations, that she though· 
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that her deceased husband was visiting her from time to 
(P. 35, 60). She often forgot when she had visitors 
(P. 49) and didn't recognize people when they did visit her. 
(R. 64). She often rambled about past occurrences (R. 64) 
and when she wrote letters, they suffered from the same lack 
of understanding and coherence, (R. 66), often being 
addressed to the wrong individual. (R. 117). 
In addition to the testimony cited above by close 
family and personal friends, independent witnesses who had 
no stake in the outcome of this matter also Lestified about 
her inability to understand this type of financial trans-
action. Her doctor, Dr. Steele, who had treated her for a 
period of over twenty years stated: 
I don't believe that she was conpetent 
to handle abstruse financial affairs. She 
was competent to handle her own personal 
hygiene and social intercourse, but I 
believe that her estimation of values, her 
memory was going, and she was having 
trouble in facing reality. She was con-
fused at many intervals. (R. 121). 
Dr. Boston who had treated her since 1972, gave similar 
testimony. (R. 182-184). 
Carna Peterson's nurse at the rest home stated that she 
was incompetent to sign the deed and would not understand 
the same. (R. 128). In fact, the assistant administrator 
of the rest home testified in addition to her being unable 
to handle financial matters, she was unable to care for her 
own needs much of the time. (R. 117). 
Probably the most persuasive testimony of Carna Peterson's 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inability to understand the trunsaction she entered into 
came from her own lips: 
Q. Did you sell your house? Did you 
sell your house? 
A. No, I didn't sell it. 
Q. What happened to it? 
A. Well, it just neaded. (sic) 
Q. Who needed it? 
A. Somebody that produce two keys could 
produce one. 
Q. Did you sell your house? Do you re-
member whether you sold your house? Did 
you sell your house to anybody? 
A. I did not sell my home. 
Q. Did you give it away? 
A. No, I did not give it away. 
Q. What did you do with it? 
A. I talked with them, and they thought 
it would be the best for them to be the 
owner of my home. 
Q. Who was going to be the owner of your 
home, your family? Did you give your 
home to your family? 
A. No. They didn't ask anybody. They 
didn't even ask me. 
Q. Well, who has your house: Who took 
your house from you? Who has it? Does 
anybody? 
A. Nobody has it, but they are renting. 
Q. I see. 
A. Divide it up among the family. And 
my daughter and a boy Dale has charge of 
that. (R. 23-24). 
On other occasions she thought she got $10,000.00 for the 
-8-
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property (Ex. l; P. 50, 70). 
This testimony is especially i~portant in light of the 
uncontroverted testimony of three witnesses that there had 
been very little if any deterioration in her mental state 
from the time of the transaction to the ti~e of her testi-
many in court. (R. 57, 119, 129). 
Finally, Don Gowers, who was the only other person who 
testified who was present at the execution of the deed 
except Milton Harmon and the respondents, testified under 
oath that he left and would have nothing further to do with 
the transaction because he thought she was incapable of 
understanding the transaction, (R. 133), and her fa~ily 
should be notified before it was consummated. (R. 133). 
Juxtaposed against this testimony is that of the res-
pondents' witnesses concerning Carna Peterson's competency. 
For example, the respondents put Lucille Shepherd on the 
stand to testify. When asked for her opinion concerning 
Mrs. Peterson's competency, however, she merely answered 
that Carna Peterson was a determined woman, never really 
addressing the issue of her competency. ( R. 16 4) • Again, 
when the respondents put Enid Worwood on the stand she 
testified that Carna Peterson knew who Mrs. Worwood was when 
she visited with her, but when asked if she was capable of 
handling a transaction involving the sale of her house, Mrs. 
Worwood had to admit: 
Well, I really couldn't say other than 
I could tell you that she talked to us, 
she knew people that we knew, she asked 
about people. (R. 206). 
-9-
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The nemorandum decision of the lower court based its 
findings of Carna Peterson's competence pr iJ~iH i ly on the 
testimony of ~lil ton Harmon. !lis testir:1ony is inconsequentia_ 
in comparison to that of the other witnesses. He had only 
2 
short limited contact with Carna Peterson on two occasions t 
(R. 87, 97, 134) and was not personally acquainted with her 
prior to the dates of the transaction. (R. 96, 97). In 
fact, he judged her to be in her late seventies or early 
eighties when in fact she was much older. ( R. 9 6) • He came 
at the respondents request (R. 76) and did not have suffici~ 
time to ascertain the aberrational character of nrs. Petersor 
When asked about her ability to understand the transaction, 
he admitted that he really could not testify about that, but 
that she appeared to be a "pleasant, bright, alert lady." 
(R. 97). If he had known about her incompetency, presumed~, 
he would not have proceeded with the transaction since to & 
so would have been a breach of the ethical standards of the 1 
legal profession. Were he to testify in any other manner, 
it would be an admission to unethical conduct. Due to the 
short time he was with her, however, he was unable to ascer-
tain her competency to the same degree that others had, such 
as her doctors and nurses, who had seen her for more exteM~ 
periods of time. 
c. Argument. 
The record is clear that Carna Peterson was unable to 
understand the transaction she entered into with the respon-
dents. She was 91 years old and was living in a rest home 
-10-
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du~ to her inability to take care of herself at the time of 
thP transaction. The evidence is thus clearly against the 
trial court's finding that Carna Peterson understood the 
transaction she entered into with the respondents. 
POINT III 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY AGAINST THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDING THAT NO UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS EXERTED O~R 
CARNA PETERSON. 
a. Undue Influence. 
When determining whether a conveyance was procurred by 
duress and undue influence, the state of the subject's 
health of body should be cons1dered as bear 'ng on his will 
to resist and the likelihood of it being overcome. Johnson 
v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959). As stated on 
several occasions by this Court: 
The condition of a man's mind is hut 
shown by specific examples of his con-
duct. Johnson, supra at 423. 
The aberrational actions of Carna Peterson were clearly 
set out in the record as discussed in Point II of this 
brief. Added to this is the rule adopted by most courts 
that whenever there is great weakness of mind in a grantor 
arising from age, though not necessarily amounting to total 
insanity, if the consideration given for the property is 
grossly inadequate, the court of equity will infer undue 
influence and set such conveyances aside. Buchmayer v. Buchmayer, 
68 Cal.2d 462, 157 P.2d 9 (1945); Morgan v. Thompson, 46 
N.M. 282, 127 P.2d 1037 (1942); and Davis v. Hulburt, 242 
-11-
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P . 2 d 7 8 4 , l 9 4 Or . 58 4 ( l 9 52 ) . C . f . '·'a l/<:~~0~ Trust 
Company v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 390, 112 P.2d 920 (1966). 
The weight of the testimony clearly shows that the 
value given for the property 1vas grossly inadequate. Ted 
Garfield, a qualified appraiser testified that the property 
was worth $11,800. (R. 105). 'l'he responciE:nt's bank apprais; 
testified that the appraised value was $12,000 to $14,000, 
(R. 126) before any improvements were made (R. 125) and they 
did in fact make a loan of $6,000 to the respondents on the 
hor:1e. (R. 114). Another bank appraiser was called by the 
respondents who testified that the home was worth only 
$6,000. (R. 229). He, however, admitted that he did not 
make any conparables for the area of the property, (R. 227), 
did not have any other dealings in that area (228), and 
there was a real question concerning his qualifications as 
an expert. ( R. 229). 
A lay appraiser of the respondents testified that the 
property was worth close to what the respondents paid for 
it, but he admitted that he had little or no experience, (R, 
217, 223-224), and that he estimated the acre of ground to 
be worth $500 and the house $2,500 in 1975. ( R. 218). 
There was also evidence that the witness signed his appraisi 
letter (Ex. 9) at the request of the respondents whc pre-
pared the same. (R. 154-155). 
b. Confidential Relationship. 
This Court has ruled on many occasions concerning 
confidential relationships that: 
-12-
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. . . when a ~onfidential relationship 
1s shown to ex1st and a gift or conveyance 
1s made to a party in a superior position 
a presumption arises that the transaction' 
was unfair. This presu~ption has the 
force of e~idence and will itself support 
a f1nd1ng lf not overcome by countcrveiling 
evidence." Johnson supra at 422. 
This Court has further held that for a confidential relation-
ship to be found it ~ust be shown that: 
The relationship must be such as would 
lead an ordinarily prudent person in the 
management of his business affairs to 
repose that degree of confidence in the 
other party which largely resultc in the 
substitution of the will of the latter for 
that of the former in the material matters 
involved in the transaction. The doctrine 
of confidential relationship rests upon 
the principle of inequality between the 
parties, and implies a position of super-
iority occupied by one of the parties over 
the other. Mere confidence in one person 
by another is not sufficient alone to con-
stitute such a relationship. The confi-
dence must be reposed by one under such 
circumstances as to create a corresponding 
duty, either legal or moral, upon the part 
of the other to observe the confidence, 
and it must result in a situation where as 
a matter of fact there is superior in-
fluence on one side and dependence on the 
other. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 
3 7 8, 4 0 l p. 2d 7l 0 ( 1 9 6 5) • 
There is strong evidence of a confidential relationship 
between the respondents and Carna Peterson, Their grand-
mother was the roo~ate of Carna Peterson in the resthome. 
(R. 54). Mrs. Peterson indicated her love, affection, and 
trust for the respondents and their family. (R. 26, 77). 
The respondent's grandmother was a witness to the trans-
action and execution of the deed. ( R. 8 3 I 8 4 ) . This I 
coupled 11ith the facts that Carna Peterson was 91 years of 
age, the respondents brought the attorney with them to 
-13-
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complete the transaction, (R. 76) anJ then threatened the 
welfare agent not to contact the far7lily abo•1t the trans-
action ( R. 136), indicates the undue influence exerted on 
Carna Peterson. This is especially true in light of the 
confidential relationship existing between the respondent's 
grandmother and Mrs. Peterson which itself gives rise to a 
presumption of undue influence. Johnson, supra. 
The record is clear and the testimony uncontroverted 
that Carna Peterson was pliable and amenable to pressures of 
people. (R. 14). As she herself testified, "they (the 
respondents) thought it would be best for them to be the 
owner of my home'', '(R. 24), and she didn't really want to 
sell it to anyone. ( R. 25). 
CONCLUSION 
Upon a complete review of the record in this matter, 
the Court should reverse the trial judge's findings that 
Carna Peterson knew and understood the transaction she 
entered into with the respondents. The great weight of t~ 
evidence is against any other finding. In addition, the 
weight of the evidence shows that this 91 year old lady 
living in a rest home, was the victim of undue influence of 
the respondents and that a confidential relationship exist~ 
between the respondents grandmother and thus the responden~ 
and Carna Peterson. This Court should reverse the trial 
court's findings on these issues and send this case back to 
the trial court for further proceedings. 
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1977. 
Eespectfully subr:Jitted this ;;J,Od,day of september, 
~J._-~i;;u 
L. VALE ~TINE, for: 
HO\ARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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